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Given that information technology (IT) security has emerged as an important issue in the last few years, thesubject of security information sharing among firms, as a tool to minimize security breaches, has gained
the interest of practitioners and academics. To promote the disclosure and sharing of cyber security information
among firms, the U.S. federal government has encouraged the establishment of many industry-based Informa-
tion Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) under Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63. Sharing security
vulnerabilities and technological solutions related to methods for preventing, detecting, and correcting security
breaches is the fundamental goal of the ISACs. However, there are a number of interesting economic issues that
will affect the achievement of this goal. Using game theory, we develop an analytical framework to investigate
the competitive implications of sharing security information and investments in security technologies. We find
that security technology investments and security information sharing act as “strategic complements” in equi-
librium. Our results suggest that information sharing is more valuable when product substitutability is higher,
implying that such sharing alliances yield greater benefits in more competitive industries. We also highlight that
the benefits from such information-sharing alliances increase with the size of the firm. We compare the levels of
information sharing and technology investments obtained when firms behave independently (Bertrand-Nash) to
those selected by an ISAC, which maximizes social welfare or joint industry profits. Our results help us predict
the consequences of establishing organizations such as ISACs, Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT),
or InfraGard by the federal government.
Key words : security technology investment; information sharing; security breaches; externality benefit; social
welfare; spillover effect
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1. Introduction
The increasing ubiquity of the Internet provides cyber
attackers more opportunities to misappropriate or
corrupt an organization’s data resources. According
to Jupiter Media Metrix, computer security breaches
could potentially cost e-businesses almost $25 bil-
lion by 2006—up from $5.5 billion in 2001.1 There
are many well-known examples of cyber hacking.
Egghead.com faced a massive backlash from its cus-
tomers after being hacked in 2000, which contributed
to its eventual bankruptcy filing. A security breach at
Travelocity in 2001 exposed the personal information
1 “Privacy Worries Plague E-Biz,” http://cyberatlas.internet.com/
markets/retailing/article.html.
of thousands of customers who had participated in a
promotion. Established firms like Citibank, Microsoft,
and NASA, among others have been targeted too.
Hence both the federal government and the private
sector have recognized a strong need to improve their
cyber security and to treat the security of critical
infrastructure assets like a strategic initiative, rather
than a compliance burden.
For awhile now, it has been recognized that a
key factor required to improve computer security is
the gathering, analysis, and sharing of information
related to successful, as well as unsuccessful, attempts
at computer security breaches. This has led the U.S.
federal government to encourage the establishment
of industry-based Information Sharing and Analysis
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Centers (ISACs) under PDD 63.2 Further, in February
2003, the President also issued The National Strat-
egy to Secure Cyberspace. ISACs are meant to facil-
itate the sharing of security information to enhance
and protect critical cyber infrastructure. In January
2001, 19 of the nation’s leading high-tech compa-
nies announced the formation of a new Information
Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Cen-
ter (IT-ISAC) to cooperate on cyber security issues in
the private sector. Using the shared information, the
IT-ISAC disseminates an integrated view of relevant
information system vulnerabilities, threats, and inci-
dents to its members. It also shares the best security
practices and solutions among its members, and thus
provides an impetus for continuous improvement
in the effectiveness of security products.3 Obviously,
such mutual collaboration is intended to increase the
technological effectiveness of IT security products,
thereby increasing their demand.
Revealing information about security breaches to
an information-sharing alliance (ISA) results in both
costs and benefits for the revealing firm. Losses can
occur when a competing firm or a third party hacks
the database of the ISA itself and leverages the
shared information to make competitive gains. Fur-
ther, it could malign the reputation of the breach-
revealing firm, by anonymously reporting it to the
public. In January 2003, Next Generation Software
Services (NGSS) claimed that Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT), the government-sponsored
Internet security reporting center, passed vulnerabil-
ity information to third parties about which NGSS
had notified CERT. NGSS felt that this was a direct
violation of trust, because the information was leaked
to potential competitors of NGSS. Eventually, NGSS
severed ties with CERT.4 Another recent incident
involved leakage of information on a fatal flaw in
a Sun Microsystems Internet software package to
2 In addition, on October 16, 2001, President Bush issued Executive
Order 13231, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information
Age,” which continued many PDD 63 activities.
3 A similar organization includes the Chemical Industry Cyber-
Security Information Sharing Network. Other ISACs have been
formed in financial services, telecommunications, energy, chemi-
cals, etc.
4 “NGSS Severs Ties with CERT,” www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/
displayNewsArchive.pl?day=030129&week=yes.
a public mailing list. The hacker intercepted the docu-
ments from CERT and posted an advisory containing
the bug’s specifics to the full disclosure security mail-
ing list.5
The potential costs of sharing security information
can have a snowball effect, accruing from the resul-
tant loss of market share and stock market value from
negative publicity (Cavusoglu et al. 2004, Campbell
et al. 2003). In a 2002 report by Jupiter Media Metrix,
IT executives revealed that they were more concerned
with the ripple effects of online security breaches on
consumer confidence and trust in e-business than the
actual financial losses of physical infrastructure. Neg-
ative exposure and loss of reputation as a result of
reports of information infrastructure violations could
be a threat to consumer confidence in a firm’s prod-
ucts. Diminished customer confidence and a tarnished
reputation can lead to reduced revenues at an increas-
ing rate.
However, there are several positive aspects to shar-
ing security information. Formally, the benefit from
mutual sharing of actual or attempted security breach
information can be partitioned into a private firm-
specific benefit and an external industry-level benefit.
This private benefit includes both the prevention of
further security breaches in the future (e.g., identify-
ing and repairing vulnerabilities in their information
security systems) as well as increased sales result-
ing from more effective security products and better
security reputation among consumers.6 Schechter and
Smith (2003) show that information sharing by firms
can act as a deterrent for hackers, thereby indirectly
increasing the effectiveness of security technologies.
One reason for entering information security
alliances is cost reduction by minimizing security
breaches. In fact, in many cases, this might be the
main motive for forming the alliance. However, there
exist strong arguments for indirect, demand-side ben-
efits as well. In business-to-business markets, firms
5 “Leaked Bug Alerts Cause a Stir,” http://www.wired.com/news/
infostructure, 03/19/03.
6 By reporting a security breach to a central monitoring agency like
CERT, a firm can send a strong message to its customers that it is
committed to developing rigorous information security procedures
and that it takes all necessary steps to mitigate damages from future
breaches (Schenk and Schenk 2002).
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that join an ISAC often have big corporations as cus-
tomers. For instance, in the IT-ISAC, the customers of
security vendors like Symantec and Computer Asso-
ciates include big corporations like Procter & Gam-
ble, Lockheed Martin, and Citibank, among others.
As customers perceive improvement in the effec-
tiveness of cyber security products—accruing from
the information-sharing behavior of security vendors
(which members of the IT-ISAC)—their overall confi-
dence increases, leading to increased demand for IT
security products. Hence security technology invest-
ments and security information sharing can involve
demand-side spillovers, which result in positive exter-
nalities for the industry as a whole. One of the main
purposes of this paper is to focus on such demand-
enhancing benefits of security information-sharing
alliances, while still keeping in mind the importance
of cost side benefits.
1.1. Research Questions and Results
For any organization focused on the reporting and
dissemination of information related to security
breaches, there are a number of interesting economic
issues that will affect its behavior. We seek to address
the following questions in this paper. (i) What are
the economic incentives for competing firms in a
given industry to share security information through
an information-sharing organization like an ISA? (ii)
How do market characteristics such as the degree of
intraindustry competitiveness, firm size, and mode of
conduct impact such sharing behavior among com-
peting firms? (iii) Do spillover effects on demand side
or cost side discourage firms from sharing security
information and result in suboptimal levels of secu-
rity technology investment? (iv) What is the impact
of such sharing alliances on social welfare when firms
individually engage in profit maximization, when the
ISA dons the role of a social planner, and when it acts
as a joint profit maximizer?
We find that security information sharing and secu-
rity technology investments can act as “strategic com-
plements” in that an increase in information sharing
or technology investments by one firm will induce
the other firm to increase its own level of infor-
mation sharing or technology investments. In fact,
this inclination to share information and invest in
security technologies increases as the degree of com-
petitiveness in an industry increases. The extent of
information sharing and investment levels of firms
introduce two effects in our model: (i) a “direct effect”
of expanding demand in the product market and
(ii) a “strategic effect” of alleviating price competition
among suppliers of competing products. We demon-
strate that these two effects increase with the size
of the firm. We extend our model to show that the
nature of security technology cost plays a pivotal role
in determining whether cost-based spillovers boost
information sharing or subdue it. In particular, the
incentives for sharing and investment are weakened
if sales volume-related cost spillovers are present,
in comparison to spillovers on fixed costs. We fur-
ther show that information-sharing levels and tech-
nology investments are higher when firms join an
ISA sequentially than when firms compete simulta-
neously. This happens because of the tacit collusion
that is induced by the first entrant’s precommitment
to share a given level of security information and
invest a given amount in security technology. This
leads to higher profits for both firms. Finally, we point
out that if a federally funded ISA were to don a
social planner’s role, it would need to provide higher
incentives for firms to share welfare-maximizing lev-
els of security information, rather than the individual
or joint profit-maximizing levels. In Appendix B, we
also allude to an incentive mechanism designed by
the government for fostering socially optimal levels
of disclosure.
1.2. Prior Literature
Questions on information sharing, economic incen-
tives, and social welfare, similar to those noted above,
have been previously studied in the context of other
organizations. Of particular relevance is the exten-
sive literature on trade associations (TAs). Previous
relevant work includes that on information sharing
(e.g., Gal-Or 1985a, Shapiro 1986, Vives 1990).7 The
second stream of literature relevant to our work is
that on mode of conduct and strategic effects (Bulow
et al. 1985, Gal-Or 1985b). More recently, Parker and
7 The information shared in these models is either information con-
cerning an industry’s demand parameter (common to all partici-
pants) or information concerning a cost parameter that is specific
(a private value) to the individual firm. In our model, the informa-
tion shared is about information security.
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Van Alstyne (2001) show how free strategic com-
plements can raise a firm’s own profits. Of course,
because an organization must expend resources to
develop technology, methods, and procedures to deal
with information security breaches, sharing of this
information will be qualitatively different than shar-
ing the type of information modeled in the TA lit-
erature.8 Finally, our model considers spillovers from
security technology investments. Spillovers have been
addressed in the extensive economics-based litera-
ture on research joint ventures (d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin 1988, Kamien et al. 1992).
Recent papers dealing with the economics of infor-
mation security and protection of critical infras-
tructure include Anderson (2001) who discusses
various distorted incentives in the information secu-
rity domain implied by the existence of moral haz-
ard and adverse selection problems. Gordon and Loeb
(2002) present a framework to determine the optimal
amount of investment to protect a given set of infor-
mation and Gordon et al. (2003) discuss the impor-
tance of security information sharing. The focus of
Gordon et al. (2003) is on how information shar-
ing affects the overall level of information security.
They highlight the trade-off that firms face between
improved information security and the potential for
free riding, which can lead to underinvestment in
security expenditures. While Gordon et al. (2003)
focus on the cost side effects of security breaches
and information sharing, our paper focuses on the
demand side effects. In particular, we highlight the
strategic implication of competition in the product
market on information sharing- and security technol-
ogy investment levels.9 As we proceed through this
paper, we clearly identify how our results are related
to Gordon et al. (2003) wherever relevant.
8 In particular, we do not consider any uncertainty in the infor-
mation that is available to firms. Rather, we find a different way
to capture the extent of information sharing without incorporating
the noisiness of the information. Specifically, the extent of informa-
tion sharing is measured in terms of the variable s ∈ 01, with
s = 0 designating no information sharing and s = 1 designating
maximum sharing. The value of s determines the extent of positive
spillover effects among firms.
9 In Gordon et al. (2003), information sharing costs and benefits
are captured by examining the effect of security investment on
expected security breach losses. In contrast, we explicitly model
such costs and benefits on the demand and cost facing each firm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes the model in detail and presents
the main results under simultaneous competition
(Bertrand-Nash) mode. We contrast these with a social
planner’s level of information sharing and technology
investments. In §3, we analyze the equilibrium under
a sequential mode of entry. Section 4 considers the
scenario when technology costs are influenced by the
volume of sales. We conclude with some implications
in §5. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
2. Model
We consider a market consisting of two firms
producing a differentiated product in a two-stage
noncooperative game. In the first stage, firms i
and j simultaneously choose optimal levels of secu-
rity technology investment, which we denote as ti tj 	
and security information-sharing levels, which we
denote as si sj 	. In the second stage, they choose
prices pi pj 	 simultaneously. We consider a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of this game using backward
induction. In this paper, we interchangeably use the
words Bertrand-Nash and simultaneous, to denote
this mode of firm conduct.10
We normalize the amount of security information
being shared so that it always lies between 0 and 1,
i.e., si ∈ 01. If si = 0, no information is shared; if
si = 1, all information is shared. The variable ti is
an aggregate measure of the extent of investment in
security technology. Because such investment entails
allocating resources to possibly multiple technologies
measured in terms of different physical units, we
measure ti in terms of one selected technology as a
numeraire.
We assume that the cost of investing in improved
security technology depends on the firm’s own invest-
ment level as well as the level of security chosen by
the competitor and the extent to which the competitor
is willing to share information about its vulnerabili-
ties. Essentially, the intuition is that the disclosure of
vulnerabilities in a particular type of security technol-
ogy by one firm leads the other firm to invest less in
10 Although firms compete à la Bertrand, they never reach marginal
cost pricing because they sell differentiated products. We use
the terminology Bertrand-Nash to indicate that firms compete by
choosing prices as their strategies.
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that technology or procure a smaller amount of that
product. For instance, if firm i were to report a higher
number of security breaches because of a particular
kind of firewall, firm j would invest less in that spe-
cific technology. A direct consequence of such infor-
mation sharing would be preemptive cost savings in
technology investment.11
Incorporating the existence of positive cost
spillovers, we specify the costs of investing in secu-
rity technology in terms of the function f iti yj 	,
where yj = ctj sj , f i/ti > 0, and f i/yj < 0. Hence
each firm’s costs rise with its own aggregate invest-
ment, but decline with the competitor’s aggregate
investment and its willingness to share information.
The coefficient c is a cost spillover parameter that
we normalize to be in the unit interval. (Gordon et al.
2003 use a similar formulation.) We also assume that
f i0yi	/ti = 0, 2f i/tiyj < 0, and 2f i/t2i > 0.
That is, the marginal cost of increased security
investment is zero when no such investment is made.
The marginal cost is decreasing when the competitor
increases its investment in security technologies or
shares more information about its security vulner-
abilities, and this marginal cost is increasing with
the firm’s own investment level.12 For simplicity,
we assume that firms’ do not incur any production
costs other than those stemming from investments in
improved security technology.
We assume that the demand facing each product is
linear in self and cross-price effects (see McGuire and
Staelin 1983).
qi = ai− b1pi+ b2pj +Bi i j = 12 i = j (1)
where 0 ≤ b2 < b1. From this point onward, we will
continue to designate the firm under consideration as
11 Note that the variable t can be interpreted as the overall level
of information security attained by the firm. Security information
disclosure allows the firm to achieve this level at a lower aggregate
cost. In the present model, we ignore issues related to the timing at
which this security is attained for a firm that has already invested
in this technology.
12 This assumption is required to guarantee the existence of an inte-
rior solution.
firm i and its competitor as firm j . As well, in describ-
ing the behavior of both firms in terms of a system of
equations, as expressed in (1), we will drop the qual-
ification, i j = 12 i = j for brevity.
The variable ai in (1) is the initial intercept of
demand facing i. This intercept may shift upward
because of the firms’ investments in improving
security as well as sharing information about their
vulnerabilities. The variable Bi in (1) measures the
potential shift of the demand intercept facing firm i.
We describe it in detail subsequently in Equation (3).
The slope b1 can be interpreted as the extent to which
consumers are price sensitive or “disloyal” to a firm’s
product, and the slope b2 provides a measure of the
degree of product substitutability. Thus, b2 = 0 implies
that firms act as local monopolists, whereas b1 = b2
corresponds to the case when products are perfectly
homogenous.
In Appendix A, we demonstrate that the linear de-
mand model is implied by a quadratic, and separable
of income, utility function. When consumers decide
upon the consumption of two products,13 subject to
their budget constraints, the above linear demand is
implied. The linear demand model has been used
extensively in marketing and economics, and there
is some research suggesting that comparative statics
derived from simpler models may often hold for more
general formulations (Milgrom 1994).
We now proceed to explain how the variable Bi,
which measures the potential shift of the demand in-
tercept of i, depends upon the investments in security
and the extent of information sharing by the firms.
We start by evaluating the possible consequences of
firms’ decisions to share information about their secu-
rity breaches. We designate the “leakage costs” that
might be inflicted on firm i as a result of such shar-
ing by gisi sj 	. Hence the level of these costs to
firm i depends on whether or not firm j = i has also
revealed information about its security breaches to the
ISA. This specification is similar to the loss function Li
assumed in Gordon et al. (2003), which measures the
cost of a security breach incurred by firm i, including,
in particular, the value of profits lost from sales. In our
formulation though, those losses are a function of the
13 Consumers can decide to diversify their consumption bundle and
buy both products in their maximization.
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extent of sharing by the firms instead of being a fixed
amount.
We assume that gisi sj 	 is increasing in si but
decreasing in sj . As the extent of sharing by i
increases, it is more likely that there could be a leak-
age of the security breach information that this firm
has experienced. This, in turn, would increase con-
sumers’ apprehension of transacting with this firm,
and thereby reduce its demand intercept. However, as
the competitor’s sharing level increases as well, some
consumers may find it optimal to switch from firm j
to firm i, given that j’s security breaches are more
likely to be revealed. We assume that the rate at which
these leakage costs increase in si and decrease in sj
is increasing. Specifically, 2gi/s2i > 0 and 
2gi/s2j <
0. This assumption is consistent with the possible
deleterious ripple effects of a security breach infor-
mation leak on firms’ own market share, as cited in
the Introduction. We also assume that 2gi/sisj ≤
0, implying that intensified sharing by the competi-
tor reduces the marginal leakage cost incurred by the
firm.14
To guarantee that own effects of sharing on leak-
age costs exceed cross effects of sharing, we assume
that when s1 = s2, gi/si> gi/sj , and 2gi/s2i >
2gj/s2i . The rationale for this assumption relates
to the two types of consumers who may face each
firm: loyal consumers and switchers. This distinction
has been widely used in the marketing literature.
(See, for instance, Narasimhan 1988.) While loyal cus-
tomers buy either product i or nothing at all, switch-
ers can be induced to purchase the competing brand j .
When si increases around a symmetric equilibrium,
firm i loses both the loyal consumers and the switch-
ers because of the reduced utility they face from the
possibility of increased leakage costs. However, when
sj increases around this equilibrium, firm i gains only
the switchers. Hence, any changes in its own level
of sharing affects leakage costs more than changes
in the level of sharing by the competitor.15 The fol-
lowing example satisfies all of the above-mentioned
14 In Appendix A, we also illustrate how these assumptions can be
derived from a specific utility function.
15 In Appendix A, we provide an alternative explanation for the
result that own effects on leakage costs are larger than cross-effects.
This explanation is based on the quadratic utility function formu-
lation that generates the linear demand functions.
properties of the function gsi sj 	:
gisi sj 	 = 1s2i −2s2j −3sisj
where 1 >2+3 (2)
The willingness of the competitor to share infor-
mation about its security breaches may have another
positive implication on the demand facing the firm.
When the consumers know that the firm is cooper-
ating with a competitor as part of the ISA, to iden-
tify the most effective ways to prevent breaches, they
are more confident that the firm’s efforts will indeed
be successful.16 We measure this additional benefit
derived by firm i in terms of the decision variables
chosen by its competitor, firm j , as dtj sj . Such a spec-
ification captures the fact that the extent of benefit to
firm i from information sharing by firm j depends on
what firm j has to share, which, in turn, depends on
the amount that firm j spends on information security
technology.17 This positive externality that accrues to
the firm depends on the value of the spillover param-
eter d. As with the cost spillover parameter, here as
well, we assume that d lies in the unit interval.
Note that the term tj sj in the above formulation
coincides with the variable yj in Gordon et al. (2003).
While in Gordon et al. (2003), this term affects the
probability of a security breach, in the present model
it affects the size of the demand. In both cases though,
sharing information results in a positive external-
ity conferred on competitors. Information on threats,
vulnerabilities, and incidents experienced by others
can help firms identify trends, better understand the
risks faced, and determine what preventive measures
should be implemented (Dacey 2003b). ISACs also
seek to promote the sharing of technology related to
detecting and stopping information security breaches,
as well as ways to repair damage caused by such
breaches. Having access to information about secu-
rity vulnerabilities and the proposed solutions of the
competitor can lead to more effective investments in
security technologies by the firm.18
16 Because consumers are rational, such enhancements in their per-
ception translates into increased demand.
17 The qualitative nature of our analysis will continue to hold as
long as the security information of the two firms are not perfect
substitutes. We thank the associate editor for pointing this out.
18 Thus, actions undertaken by firms that boost the consumer com-
fort level, in terms of alleviating their “perceived security risk,” can
Gal-Or and Ghose: The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information
192 Information Systems Research 16(2), pp. 186–208, © 2005 INFORMS
Finally, the demand intercept facing each firm may
shift because of the investments undertaken by both
firms, even in the absence of any information shar-
ing between them. When a given firm increases its
investment in security technology to prevent secu-
rity breaches or enhance the effectiveness of secu-
rity products, and consumers become informed of
this increase, their level of anxiety about transacting
with the firm declines, thus enhancing their expected
utility and willingness to pay for the product. In
contrast, if the competitor increases its level of invest-
ment and consumers become aware of it, the firm
may experience a negative demand shock and lose
some customers (for example, the switchers) because
the competitor may now be considered the more reli-
able and secure source of supply. We summarize this
net effect of the firms’ investments on the demand
intercept of firm i in terms of the difference ti−tj	,
where 0≤ < 1. Once again, since  is a fraction, own
effects of investment exceed cross-effects.
Combining the benefits and costs of investments
in security technology as well as information sharing
yields the following net benefit function that can shift
the demand intercept of firm i19:
Bi = ti−tj +dtj sj − gisi sj 	 (3)
Note that the competitor’s level of investment has
both positive and negative implications on firm i’s
demand. On the positive side, consumers are
reassured that i’s membership in the ISA is more ben-
eficial to it, given that j reveals information concern-
ing a larger level of investment. On the negative side,
the competitor now appears a more attractive option
to consumers. Since the former effect depends on the
extent of sharing by j , the positive spillover expres-
sion depends on the product tj sj .
2.1. Analysis
At the second stage, firm i chooses its price pi to max-
imize its objective. The profit function of firm i can be
in the long run lead to an increase in their own product sales as
well as an expansion in the whole market.
19 The qualitative nature of our results hold with different formula-
tions of the benefit function. In particular, any increasing and con-
cave function of ti−tj +dtj sj 	 can replace the linear specification
above without changing our results. As well, in Appendix A we
provide an alternative interpretation to the “demand effect” benefit
component Bi.
written as
i = piqi− f iti yj 	
From the first-order conditions (FOCs) for profit max-
imization, we derive the second-stage equilibrium
prices, which are summarized in Appendix A. These
become the starting point for deriving comparative
statics to examine how changes in the exogenous and
endogenous variables affect firm strategies and profits
under different market conditions. In deriving some
of the comparative statics, we will need the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1.
≤
(
dmins1 s2 +
b2
2b1
)
= 
Assumption 2.[
−
(
2b1
gi
si
+ b2
gj
si
)
si=sj=0
+ b2dti
]
> 0
[
−
(
2b1
gi
si
+ b2
gj
si
)
si=sj=1
+ b2dti
]
< 0
Assumption 1 asserts that the negative implications
of increased security investment by the competitor on
the firm’s demand is not “too large.” This assumption
is more likely to be valid when the demand spillover
parameter d or the degree of substitutability between
products, b2, is relatively high. Assumption 2 consists
of two parts. The first relates to the possibility that
both firms share no information with each other and
the second relates to the case that they share full infor-
mation. In the former case, Assumption 2 asserts that
the negative consequences of increasing the extent of
sharing, as measured by the “marginal leakage costs,”
are outweighed by the positive impact of such shar-
ing, as measured by the marginal “demand spillover
effect.” The second part of Assumption 2 asserts that
the opposite is the case when both firms share full
information with each other.
Proposition 1. (i) A firm’s price increases with an
increase in its own investment in security technology. As
well, under Assumption 1, price also increases with the
competitor’s level of investment. Hence, dpi/dti > 0 and
dpi/dtj > 0
(ii) Under Assumption 2, each firm’s price follows an
inverted U-shaped curve with an increase in security
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information sharing, i.e., pi/si > 0 for si ∈ 0 sci 	 and
pi/si < 0 for si ∈ sci 1	, where 0< sci < 1.
Increased investment in security technology by the
firm shifts its demand outward and raises its price
reaction function. As a result, the firm chooses to raise
its prices. When the competitor increases its security
investment level, the competitor’s price reaction func-
tion shifts up. With upward sloping reaction func-
tions, this shift leads the firm to raise its own price
as well, as long as the parameter  is not “too large.”
Recall that this parameter measures the negative con-
sequences of the competitor’s investment level on the
firm’s demand intercept.
When the firm intensifies its extent of sharing, there
are two countervailing effects on its own demand and
that of its competitor. Intensified sharing of security
information increases the firm’s own leakage costs,
thus reducing the demand facing it. On the other
hand, because of spillover effects and reduced leak-
age costs of the competitor, the demand facing the
competitor shifts outward. Because of the former,
direct effect, the firm has an incentive to reduce its
price. However, because of the latter, strategic effect,
the competitor has an incentive to raise its price,
which with upward sloping reaction functions, pro-
vides an incentive for the firm to raise its own price
as well. The second part of Proposition 1 states that
for small values of si < sci , the latter strategic effect
dominates and for large value of si > sci , the former
direct effect dominates. Assumption 2 guarantees that
perfect information sharing can never arise in equi-
librium, thus leading to an interior solution, so that
sci is a fraction. Basically, because the marginal leak-
age cost with perfect information sharing is relatively
large compared to positive spillovers on demand, full
information sharing cannot be an equilibrium; and
conversely, since the marginal leakage costs with no
information sharing is relatively small in comparison
to the positive demand spillovers, some information
sharing does arise at the equilibrium.
Substituting the second-stage prices back into each
firm’s objective function, we can obtain the first-stage
payoff function in reduced form as
i = b1p2i − f iti yj 	 (4)
where pi solve the FOCs. Differentiating with
respect to the first-stage decision variables yields the
following two FOCs.20
di
dsi
= 2b1pi
pi
si
= 0 (5)
Hi =
di
dti
= 2b1pi
pi
ti
− f
i
ti
= 0 (6)
Lemma 1. (i) Under Assumption 2, full information
sharing is inconsistent with a symmetric equilibrium.
Specifically, the optimal levels of information sharing and
security technology investment are given as the solution to
[
2b1
(
gi
si
)
+ b2
(
gj
si
)]
= b2dti
f i
ti
= 2b1pi
(
2b1+ b2dsi−	
4b21 − b22	
)

(ii) The reaction functions of both firms with respect
to the extent of security information sharing are upward
sloping, i.e., si/sj > 0 and ti/sj > 0. As well, under
Assumption 1, the reaction functions of both firms with
respect to the extent of security investment are also upward
sloping, i.e., si/tj > 0, ti/tj > 0.
A direct interpretation of the results reported in
Lemma 1 is provided in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. (i) A higher level of security informa-
tion sharing by one firm leads to a higher level of informa-
tion sharing and security investment by its competitor.
As well, if ≤ ,
(ii) A higher level of security technology investment by
one firm leads to a higher level of information sharing and
security investment by its competitor.
(iii) Security technology investment and security infor-
mation sharing act as strategic complements in this case.
Our analysis reveals that the reaction functions are
upward sloping; that is, an increase in security tech-
nology investment by firm i induces a higher level
of information sharing by firm j and vice versa. The
two inputs act as strategic complements. This is evident
from the fact that 2i/sitj > 0, i.e., the increase in
profits with increased information sharing for firm i is
higher for higher levels of technology investment by
firm j and vice versa. Further, 2i/sisj > 0, i.e., the
20 Because we do not get closed-form solutions for the first-stage
decision variables, we adopt the implicit function approach to
present our results and gain insight.
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increase in profits with increased information shar-
ing for firm i is higher for higher levels of informa-
tion sharing by firm j and vice versa. Hence, as we
observed in Lemma 1, firm i responds to less aggres-
sive play by firm j by being less aggressive itself. The
same intuition applies to the change in a firm’s prof-
its with a change in security technology investment
by the other firm, where we find that 2i/titj > 0,
when  is sufficiently small.
Note that the upper bound on  that is stated in
Proposition 2 is stronger than necessary. To guaran-
tee that the slopes si/tj and ti/tj are positive, the
parameter  cannot be too large, but a weaker condi-
tion than the one stated in Proposition 2 is sufficient
(a higher upper bound on ).
Contrary to our results, when Gordon et al. (2003)
use the “restricted cost” function, f iti yj 	= f ti−yj	,
they find that when firms share information, each
firm has reduced incentives to invest in information
security. The main reason for the different result is the
existence of the demand-enhancing effects of informa-
tion security sharing and technology investments in
our model.21
It is important to note that the existence of positive
demand spillovers (i.e., d > 0) is essential to obtain
a certain degree of sharing between the firms in our
model. If d < 0, so that there are negative demand
spillovers, the only possible symmetric equilibrium is
for firms not to share any information at all; namely,
si = sj = 0. To see it, note that
pi
si
∣∣∣∣
s1=s2=s
≡
[
−
(
2b1
gi
si
+ b2
gj
si
)∣∣∣∣
s1=s2=s
+b2dti
]

Hence, if d < 0, the above is negative for all val-
ues of s ∈ 01, given our assumption that their own
effects always dominate cross-effects. From Equa-
tion (5), therefore, no information sharing is the only
possible outcome. However, even in this case, security
investment reaction functions may still slope upward
(i.e., ti/tj > 0) provided that the parameter  is suf-
ficiently small (i.e., ≤ b2/2b1	.
21 Using an unrestricted case, Gordon et al. (2003) also show that
information sharing can lead to an increase in sharing and in the
achieved level of information security.
Proposition 3. (i) A lower level of firm loyalty leads
to lower levels of security information sharing and security
technology investment, i.e., si/b1 < 0 ti/b1 < 0.
(ii) When  ≤ , the extent of information sharing
and amount of security technology investment by both
firms increase when the degree of product substitutability
increases, i.e., si/b2 > 0 ti/b2 > 0.
We highlight that a steeper demand schedule, b1,
lowers a firm’s propensity to invest in security tech-
nology and share security information. A steeper
slope implies that each firm sells fewer units of the
product for a given level of the equilibrium prices.22
Smaller quantities imply, in turn, that the marginal
return to any kind of technology investment is more
limited. As a result, the firms have reduced incentives
to invest in enhanced security technology. Further, the
strategic complementarity between technology invest-
ment and information sharing implies also that the
extent of sharing declines when demand schedules
are steeper.
Quite interestingly, to the extent that product sub-
stitutability is indicative of the degree of compe-
tition in an industry, we find that a higher level
of intraindustry competitiveness may lead to higher
levels of security information sharing and increased
investment in security technologies by both firms,
when  is sufficiently small. Firms generally respond
to increased competition with aggressive price cuts.
To alleviate such aggressive price competition, firms
have greater incentives to invest in mechanisms that
alleviate price competition.23 Because increases in s
and t may help in mitigating price competition, both
firms may decide to raise the extent of information
sharing and investments when the degree of substi-
tutability between the firms’ products increases.
We would like to point out that the intuition for our
comparative statics results with respect to parame-
ters b1 and b2 follows from the existence of two effects:
a direct effect and a strategic effect. This is evident
when optimizing the objective function in Stage 1
with respect to the decision variables si and ti. Differ-
entiating w.r.t. si and ti separately, yields the following
22 Because an increase in b1 implies that consumers are more price
sensitive, it leads to a lower level of demand at a given price.
23 For instance, in the airline industry, which has been characterized
by stiff price competition, firms have developed Frequent Flyer
Programs as a mechanism to reduce cut-throat pricing.
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equations:
di
dsi
= i
si
+ i
pj
pj
si
+ i
pi
pi
si
 (7)
di
dti
= i
ti
+ i
pj
pj
ti
+ i
pi
pi
ti
 (8)
Because the prices selected in the second stage solve
the condition i/pi = 0, in equilibrium the third
term in both Equations (7) and (8) is equal to 0 (by the
envelope theorem). The first terms in Equations (7)
and (8) measure the direct effect of increased informa-
tion sharing, and the second terms in the equations
measure the strategic effect. The degree of substitutabil-
ity, b2, affects primarily the magnitude of the strategic
effect and the degree of disloyalty, b1, affects primarily
the magnitude of the direct effect. Note that the sign
of the strategic effect is positive since from Propo-
sition 1, the competitor raises prices when the firm
shares more security information or increases security
technology investment (pj/si > 0 and pj/ti > 0	.
When b2 increases, the importance of alleviating
price competition becomes especially pronounced,
and as a result firms are willing to share more infor-
mation and invest more in security technology. In con-
trast, when b1 increases the magnitude of the direct
effect declines because each producer sells smaller
volumes as a result of the increase in disloyalty of
consumers. With smaller volumes, firms have lower
incentives to make any kind of investment, including
in improving information security. Because security
technology and information sharing are complemen-
tary, they also cut back on their extent of sharing. In
general, in all the comparative statics, the two effects
mentioned above are present. Changes that reduce
size (quantity) reduce the direct effect and, there-
fore, the incentives to invest in technology and share
security information. On the other hand, changes that
intensify price competition increase the strategic effect
and, therefore, the incentives to invest and share.
Proposition 4. (i) Security information sharing and
security technology investment levels increase with firm
size.
(ii) A lower level of demand spillover and cost spillover
discourages security information sharing and technology
investments, i.e., si/d > 0, si/c > 0, ti/d > 0,
ti/c > 0.
(iii) A bigger value of  discourages security informa-
tion sharing and technology investments, i.e., si/ < 0
and ti/< 0.
Proposition 4(i) suggests that investing in security
information is more valuable to larger firms, because
the marginal return to investment is directly related
to the volume of sales of the firms. This conclu-
sion is consistent with the well-known result that a
monopolist benefits more from cost-reducing inno-
vations than a firm competing in a duopoly, given
that it can extract a higher proportion of the surplus
from the market.24 Because information sharing and
technology investment act as strategic complements,
this increased security investment also leads to higher
security information sharing by the larger firm.
The result stated in Proposition 4(ii) implies that
higher demand-side spillovers promote higher levels
of information sharing and technology investment.
Increased spillovers shift the demand curve outward,
which enable firms to increase their prices and, as a
result, their profits. Similarly, increased cost spillovers
imply that the marginal cost of investment declines,
thus providing greater incentives for the firm to inten-
sify security investments and information sharing.
Note that the latter result is implied by our assump-
tion that the cost of investing in security information
is independent of the firm’s volume of sales. In §4,
we demonstrate that cost spillovers have an oppo-
site effect to that described in the above proposition
when the cost of investment is volume dependent.
This opposing effect was also derived in Gordon et al.
(2003).
As pointed out earlier, the results reported in
Proposition 4(ii) rely on the existence of positive
demand spillovers that lead to some information
sharing at the equilibrium. Since in our model
spillovers exist only if firms communicate with each
other, the investment in security technology is inde-
pendent of the values of d and c when d < 0 (i.e.,
t/d = t/c = 0).
Proposition 4(iii) evaluates the parameter , which
measures the adverse implications of the competitor’s
24 Basically, the extent of incentives to invest in technology and
share information is a function of the degree of concentration
of firms in the market. As the number of firms in the industry
decreases, the marginal benefit from the technology investment and
information sharing increases.
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security investment on the demand intercept of a
given firm. According to this part, bigger values of 
discourage technology investments and information
sharing. This result is quite intuitive, as bigger values
of  imply lower volumes of sales and, as explained
before, reduced incentives to invest.
2.2. Social Welfare
We now consider the case that the ISA dons the role of
a federally funded social planner. From the demand
expressions, one can derive the inverse demand func-
tions in terms of prices such that pi = Fiqi qj 	. Let q1 =
q2 = q∗ denote the equilibrium quantity determined
by the market. Focusing on a symmetric environment,
where the social planner sets t1 = t2 = t, s1 = s2 = s,
and F1q q	 = F2q q	 = F q q	, social welfare can be
written as follows:
SW = 2
∫ q∗
0
F q q	dq− 2f itcts	
= 2
∫ q∗
0
a+B− q
b1− b2
dq− 2f itcts	 (9)
where
B = t1−	+dts− gis s	 (10)
In Appendix A, we show that the social welfare
maximizing level of information sharing is higher
than the solution to B/s = 0. This last condition
implies that the direct net marginal benefit of infor-
mation sharing on each firm’s demand is equal to
zero. Using Equation (10),
B
s
= dt−
(
gi
si
+ g
i
sj
)
= 0 (11)
When each firm maximizes its own profits under
a Nash equilibrium, it chooses the extent of informa-
tion sharing to satisfy pi/si = 0. Hence the optimal
level of information chosen at the market equilibrium,
sNE∗ satisfies the following condition:
dt−
(
2b1
b2
gi
si
+ g
i
sj
)
= 0 (12)
Because 2b1/b2 > 1, it follows from comparing Equa-
tion (12) with (11), that for a fixed level of security
technology investment, the socially optimal level of
information shared is higher than that chosen under
the Bertrand-Nash market equilibrium where firms
are engaged in individual profit maximization.
Next, we consider the case where the ISA coordi-
nates the choices of its members, in terms of their
security technology investments and extent of infor-
mation sharing, to maximize joint industry profits. In
spite of this coordination on the choice of s and t,
we assume that the ISA is prohibited from facilitating
price coordination among its members. Prices are still
given, therefore, by Equation (21) (in Appendix A),
which at the symmetric equilibrium reduces to
p∗ = a+B
2b1− b2

Because q∗ = b1p∗, joint industry profits can be
expressed as follows:
JP =1+2 =
2b1a+B	2
2b1− b2	2
− 2f itcts	
The ISA chooses s and t to maximize the above pay-
off function. The optimization with respect to s and t
yields the conditions, respectively.
JP
s
= 4b1a+B	
2b1− b2	2
B
s
− 2ct
f i
yj
= 0 (13)
JP
t
= 4b1a+B	
2b1− b2	2
B
t
− 2
[
f i
ti
+cs
f i
yj
]
= 0 (14)
A comparison of Equations (13) and (14) with (27)
and (28) (from Appendix A) implies that maximiz-
ing social welfare yields higher levels of sharing
and security technology investment than that chosen
under joint profit maximization. A similar compar-
ison of Equations (13) and (14) with (12) and (29)
(in Appendix A), yields that joint profit maximization
yields higher levels of sharing and security invest-
ment than that obtained at the market equilibrium.
In Proposition 5, we summarize the comparison of
the extent of information sharing and technology
investment under the three regimes discussed above:
welfare maximization, joint profit maximization, and
individual profit maximization.
Proposition 5. (i) Social welfare at the symmetric
Bertrand equilibrium is higher with security information
sharing than with no sharing.
(ii) When ≤ , the level of security information shar-
ing and security technology investment that are socially
optimal are higher than those selected by an ISA whose
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objective is to maximize joint industry profits. Moreover,
a joint profit maximizing ISA chooses higher levels of
information sharing and technology investment than those
selected at the market equilibrium, when firms are engaged
in individual profit maximization.
The comparison presented in Proposition 5 can be
explained by recalling the different objectives of the
social planner, the joint profit maximizing ISA, and
the individual firms. While the ISA’s objective is to
maximize total industry profits, the social planner
aims to maximize the sum of the consumer and pro-
ducer surplus. Hence, the joint profit maximizing ISA
implements lower levels of technology investment
and security information sharing than the social plan-
ner, because it does not incorporate the added benefit
to consumers from enhanced technology investments.
The reason the joint profit maximizing ISA wishes to
implement higher levels of information sharing and
security technology investment than firms that choose
these decision variables independently, stems from
the fact that individual firms do not fully internal-
ize the positive externality that the investment con-
fers on their competitors. Hence, this decreases the
marginal return from information sharing and tech-
nology investment.
Once again, it is important to note that the com-
parison conducted in Proposition 5 depends on
our assumption that d > 0. With negative demand
spillovers, a social planner may also wish to prevent
any information sharing among firms if the extent of
adverse demand spillovers is relatively big, in com-
parison to the extent of positive cost spillovers. From
Equation (27) in Appendix A, it follows that if the
magnitude of d (when negative) is relatively big in
comparison to the magnitude of c, a social planner
will choose si = sj = 0, similar to firms that act as Nash
competitors.
The result reported in Proposition 5 implies that the
government should encourage industry participants
to cooperate in setting their security investments and
information sharing levels. Even if their coordination
does not result in socially optimal levels of invest-
ment and sharing, it still yields an improvement over
the outcome attained in the absence of coordination.
This conclusion is valid, however, only if members
of the ISA do not use those coordination activities
as a vehicle to collude on prices. If formation of the
joint profit maximizing ISA facilitates such collusion,
the members may raise prices above the Bertrand-
Nash level and, consequently, reduce social welfare.
Whereas prices at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium are
equal to pNE = a + B	/2b1 − b2	, price under collu-
sion is the monopoly price pJP = a+ B	/2b1 − b2		.
For a fixed level of security technology investment,
the higher prices selected under collusion result in
reduced quantities demanded by consumers, since
qJP = a+B	/2< b1a+B		/2b1−b2	= qNE . Given that
quantities at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium qNE∗ fall
short of the socially optimal level of production qSW ∗ ,
the further decline of quantities because of collusion
in pricing reduces social welfare. This points out the
need for legislation, which would allow an ISA to
choose levels of security information sharing but pre-
vent members from colluding in prices.
Our result that information sharing is social wel-
fare enhancing is also consistent with the findings
of Gordon et al. (2003) who posit that at the Nash
equilibrium, a small increase in expenditures on infor-
mation security by either firm would increase social
welfare. They also point out that the socially optimal
expenditure levels for each firm are greater than the
Nash equilibrium levels. However, they highlight that
this may not hold true for both firms simultaneously,
if there is asymmetry among firms in terms of IT secu-
rity productivity.
3. Sequential Entry
Analytical modelers have recognized that the qualita-
tive insights regarding market equilibria often depend
on the sequence in which firms in an industry choose
their strategies. While the simultaneous mode of con-
duct is more common in fragmented industries, there
are numerous examples where one firm acts as a
leader and others act as followers in a given industry.
Firms may understandably be reluctant to share sen-
sitive proprietary information on security practices,
intrusions, and actual crimes with either government
agencies or competitors. To many firms, information
sharing is a risky proposition with less than clear ben-
efits. Specifically, concerns have been raised that a
firm’s information could be subject to the Freedom
of Information Act, or face potential liability concerns
for information shared in good faith (Dacey 2003b).
These actions could potentially jeopardize a firm’s
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market share or customer base. This may be espe-
cially true when some firms are more likely to be
pioneering in their approach to disclosing critical
information while others adopt a “wait and watch
policy.”25 It may be interesting, therefore, to com-
pare the amount of security information sharing and
technology investment when firms join an ISA in a
sequential manner, with the case when they make
their choices simultaneously.
Hence, we consider a scenario where an incum-
bent firm has already committed to sharing infor-
mation and investing in technology, anticipating the
entry and similar sharing behavior of another firm. In
Stage 1, the incumbent chooses si ti	, and in Stage 2,
the entrant chooses sj tj 	. In Stage 3, both firms
choose prices pi pj 	 simultaneously. With sequen-
tial choices, the FOCs for firm i (incumbent) are as
follows:
Gi =
di
dsi
= 2b1pi
pi
si
+ 2b1pi
pi
sj
sj
si
+ 2b1pi
pi
tj
tj
si
= 0 (15)
Hi =
di
dti
= 2b1pi
pi
ti
+ 2b1pi
pi
tj
tj
ti
+ 2b1pi
pi
sj
sj
ti
− f
i
ti
= 0 (16)
Note, however, that the FOCs for the follower will
be similar to those in the simultaneous mode, given
by Equations (5) and (6).
Proposition 6. The optimal amount of shared security
information and security technology investment by firm i
(incumbent) will be higher in the sequential mode than in
the simultaneous mode, provided that ≤ .
Comparing FOCs given by Equations (15) and (16)
with (5) and (6), implies that with sequential entry,
each FOC of the leader includes an additional positive
term that reflects the “Stackelberg effect.” This effect
occurs because the leader incorporates the implica-
tion of its own investment ti	 and sharing si	 on
the choice of the levels of investment tj 	 and shar-
ing sj 	made subsequently by the follower. The leader
25 Starting with October 2000, there were only 277 members who
had joined InfraGard. By early January 2001, 518 entities had
joined. As of February 2003 InfraGard members totaled more than
6,700 (Dacey 2003a).
knows, in particular, that such a precommitment to
increase the security technology investment or shared
security information will induce the entrant to do
the same.26 Because increased information sharing
and technology investment leads to softening of price
competition, both firms’ profits will be strictly higher
in the sequential mode than in the simultaneous mode
game. Proposition 6 suggests that security informa-
tion sharing and security technology investment are
indeed higher in the former than in the latter mode,
leading to higher profits because of further alleviation
of price competition.27
4. Impact of Volume-Related Costs
Many firms believe that increased efficiency may
be attained by outsourcing the information secu-
rity function. Hence, some firms have outsourced
their security and network management to an exter-
nal entity like a managed security services provider
(MSSP). This entity engages in modulation of secu-
rity resources and services, depending on con-
trol/variability.28 During the course of outsourcing,
an MSSP often provides different levels of quality of
security service (QoSS) based on the size of the firm.
Given that the payment to the MSSP may depend on
the firm size, it would be appropriate to modify our
model by including some additional technology costs,
which are affected by the volume of sales. Even if
the firm manages its own security, as demand and
the corresponding IT infrastructure grows, so would
costs related to installation of additional servers, QoSS
license fees, dynamic security service agreements,
26 By choosing a higher level of si ti	, the leader moves in a direc-
tion that is favorable for both firms, and thus convinces the entrant
to follow suit. This, in turn, results in improved opportunities for
tacit collusion.
27 It is also possible to consider the scenario in which technology
investments ti tj 	 are chosen first and simultaneously by firms,
followed by information-sharing levels in the penultimate stage
si sj 	, and prices pi pj 	 in the last stage. Even in this scenario,
higher levels of technology investment and information sharing
arise in equilibrium, compared to the simultaneous mode game
considered in the previous section. Proof of this is available from
the authors upon request.
28 Examples of variant security include the length of encryption
keys, assurance level of remote execution environment, intensity
level of boundary controllers like IDS, firewall, etc.
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increasing utilization of associated security weapons
like firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), vir-
tual private networks, content filters, access control
systems, etc. In this section, we analyze the impact
of sales volume-related costs of technology on firms’
optimal sharing and investment strategies.
Having considered cost spillovers on fixed costs,
we now consider only spillovers on security tech-
nology costs, which are influenced by the volume
of sales. We model the new marginal cost function
as c− ˆtj sj 	*ti	 and assume that *′ > 0, *′′ > 0.
The parameter ˆ is the “volume-related cost side”
spillover from information sharing. In this new envi-
ronment, the first-stage profit equation in reduced
form is
i = b1pi− c− ˆtj sj 	*ti		2− f ti	
where, for simplicity, we assume the nonexistence of
fixed cost spillovers (i.e., c = 0). Designating the term
c− ˆtj sj 	*ti	= Fi the FOCs can now be written as:
Gi =
d
dsi
= 2b1pi− Fi	
pi
si
= 0 (17)
Hi =
d
dti
= 2b1pi− Fi	
(
pi
ti
− Fi
ti
)
− f ′ti	= 0 (18)
From conditions (17) and (18), we can assess how cost
side spillovers impact firms’ incentives to share infor-
mation and invest in technology. We formally show
the following:
Proposition 7. When the costs of security technology
investment are affected by the volume of sales, and there
are “volume-related cost side spillovers” as captured by the
parameter ˆ,
(i) An increase in ˆ has ambiguous implications on the
propensity to share security information or invest in secu-
rity technology for both firms.
(ii) Volume-related spillovers reduce incentives to share
information in comparison to an environment, where no
such spillovers exist.
Changes in the spillover parameter ˆ introduce
two countervailing effects. An increase in ˆ makes
firm i’s competitor more efficient by reducing its unit
cost c − ˆtisi. This enables j to price more aggres-
sively. If firm i increases its level of information
shared, it further increases the cost efficiency of the
competitor, which acts to the disadvantage of the
firm. Because the improved cost efficiency precipitates
further price competition, both firms respond strate-
gically by reducing their levels of information shar-
ing. On the other hand, an increase in ˆ increases
the profit margin of each firm, thus providing greater
incentives for increased investment in technology and
information sharing. In Appendix A, we demonstrate
that the relative size of the above-mentioned effects
depends on the ratio of the two parameters measuring
demand and volume-related cost spillovers, d/ˆ	.
The smaller this ratio, the bigger the former effect,
implying that increased volume-related cost spillovers
reduce the incentives to share information.
It may also be interesting to investigate what hap-
pens to the slope of the information-sharing reaction
functions. We demonstrate that the information-
sharing reaction function, si/sj , is not necessarily
increasing, unlike in the case when there are no
volume-related costs of investing in security technol-
ogy. In particular, the sign of the slope of this reaction
function is determined by the size of the param-
eter ˆ. For small values of ˆ, si/sj > 0, and for
large, si/sj < 0. Thus, only if volume-related cost
spillovers are sufficiently small, information sharing
by one firm induces the other firm to share more
information. While a higher level of information shar-
ing fosters greater opportunities for tacit collusion, as
derived in earlier sections, it also leads to a more effi-
cient competitor who faces lower variable costs. Such
a competitor tends to price more aggressively. When
the value of ˆ is sufficiently big, the latter effect is
significant, thus reversing the result we have derived
in the absence of volume-related cost spillovers.
Volume-related spillovers costs yield, therefore, pre-
dictions that are more consistent with the free-riding
behavior described in Gordon et al. (2003) or in the
R&D literature (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988,
Kamien et al. 1992).29
29 This result also corresponds well with Gordon et al. (2003) who
point out that whether or not information sharing results in an
increased level of security depends on the nature of the probability
security breach function. Basically, what drives their result is the
relative size of the firm’s marginal benefit from an additional dollar
of information security expenditure, at different levels of security
investment.
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5. Implications, Conclusion, and
Extensions
The U.S. federal government has encouraged the for-
mation of ISACs, with the goal of helping protect
critical infrastructure assets that are largely owned
and operated by the private sector. This has been
witnessed in industries such as banking and finance,
IT, chemicals, oil and gas, electricity, etc. The under-
lying assumption is that such centrally coordinated
information-sharing organizations would facilitate
the alignment of goals for both the private sector
and the federal government, which, in turn, would
improve the security of cyber infrastructure assets.
However, all sectors do not have a fully established
ISAC, and in those sectors that do, there is mixed par-
ticipation. Specifically, five recently reviewed ISACs
showed different levels of progress in implementing
the PDD 63 suggested activities.30 Hence, the govern-
ment felt the importance to identify economic incen-
tives to encourage the desired information-sharing
behavior in IT security (Dacey 2003a).
We develop a model to investigate the benefits to
firms from joining such security information-sharing
alliances. Our results point out that if information
sharing among members of the alliance had suffi-
ciently large positive implications on the demand
facing the firms, there are, indeed, strong economic
incentives for firms to engage in sharing security
information. Increase in security information sharing
may yield two benefits for the firms: a “direct effect,”
which increases demand and a “strategic effect,”
which alleviates price competition. These incentives
become stronger with increases in the firm size and
the degree of competition. Because such alliances can
give rise to positive spillover effects, we investigate
their impact on sharing and security investment lev-
els. Importantly, we demonstrate that the nature of
the security technology cost function plays a pivotal
role in determining whether spillovers are beneficial
or detrimental to firms’ incentives to join the ISA. We
also point out that joining the ISA may not be ben-
eficial to the firm if it loses its competitive advan-
tage in the marketplace, when competing against a
rival whose product is perceived to be more secure by
30 These were the IT, telecommunications, energy, water, and elec-
tricity ISACs.
consumers. To support the existence of incentives for
information sharing, the extent of positive demand
spillovers should be sufficiently large to more than
offset this adverse implication on the competitive
position of the firm.31
We find that an increase in security informa-
tion sharing and security technology investment lev-
els lead to higher social welfare, compared to the
no-sharing regime. However, the equilibrium levels
vary depending on whether an ISA enacts the role of a
social planner or a joint profit maximizer. The levels of
security information sharing and technology invest-
ment obtained under a market equilibrium fall short
of those that maximize social welfare. Even when the
members of an ISA coordinate their information shar-
ing and technology investment decisions to maximize
joint industry profits, the extent of sharing and invest-
ment falls short of socially desirable levels. Joint profit
maximization yields, however, higher levels of shar-
ing than those obtained at the market (Bertrand-Nash)
equilibrium, implying that coordination among firms
on technology security should actually be encour-
aged by the federal government.32 Even if their coor-
dination does not result in socially optimal levels
of technology investment and information sharing, it
still yields an improvement over the outcome attained
in the absence of coordination.
Our model shows that when firms face volume-
related costs, increased spillover effects do not neces-
sarily encourage firms to share security information.
In our analysis, we have only considered symmet-
ric cost side spillovers, implying that both firms are
equally efficient in utilizing the shared security infor-
mation in reducing their marginal costs of technol-
ogy investment. In future research, we plan to extend
the model to allow for asymmetries among firms in
utilizing the cost side spillover benefit. A prelimi-
nary investigation indicates that if firms differ in their
intrinsic ability to utilize the shared information, the
more efficient firm may have stronger incentives to
underinvest in security technology and have lower
incentives to share information, compared to the less
31 The comparison of the parameters  and d as expressed in the
Assumption 1 of our model.
32 ISAs should not be allowed to restrain trade by restricting output,
coordinating prices, or otherwise inhibiting competition, on which
antitrust laws generally focus.
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efficient firm. The total effect of a change in the
spillover parameter is not driven by the direct effect
of this change alone, but also by the competitor’s reac-
tion to it. This opens up the possibility of indirect free-
riding behavior by the more efficient firm. Gordon
et al. (2003) also point out such a possibility in their
model.
ISACs do not seem to have well-designed incen-
tives to prevent firms from free riding. Additionally,
firms that join such alliances are often concerned
about providing competitive advantage to other
member firms. Thus, there is a possibility that even
after entering an alliance, firms might renege on shar-
ing security breach information with other member
firms. To mitigate such concerns, the Chemical Indus-
try Cyber-Security Information Sharing Network has
put in place standards for authentication and verifi-
cation of the security information being shared.
While PDD 63 encouraged the creation of ISACs,
it left the actual design and function of the ISACs to
be determined by the private sector in consultation
with the federal government (Dacey 2003a). A signif-
icant implication of our model is that rigorous empir-
ical studies of the structure and activities of such
information-sharing organizations are needed. These
studies would not only determine the actual lev-
els of information sharing occurring among members
of ISACs, but could provide deep insights into the
appropriate incentives that may be required to facil-
itate such sharing, without causing excessive price
increases.33 These incentives may include various
public policy tools related to tax benefits, subsidies,
or specific legislation protecting firms from antitrust
actions. In addition, empirical studies could address
the role of government intervention in the form of
optimal incentives or subsidies to prevent firms from
reneging on their information-sharing commitments.
Although markets differ in a number of ways, we
consider only a limited number of market charac-
teristics in our research. For instance, in our social
welfare analysis, we focus on only one industry. In
reality, a security breach in a critical infrastructure
industry, such as banking, may adversely affect pro-
ducers and consumers in other industries. Ideally,
33 Dacey (2003b) outlines some actual levels of information shar-
ing and reporting (to the National Infrastructure Protection Center)
occurring in these ISACs.
a social welfare function should recognize such cross-
industry spillover effects. Another limitation of our
model is that we implicitly assume that whatever
security information a firm is willing to share, it
shares it truthfully. However, in the absence of addi-
tional incentives, truthtelling may not be an equilib-
rium outcome as has been shown by Ziv (1993) in the
context of trade associations.34 Despite these limita-
tions, we believe that our model addresses an impor-
tant issue, and hope that the proposed approach may
be used as a starting point for additional research in
this area.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Derivation of Benefit Function
Assume that the utility of a representative consumer when
consuming q1 and q2 units of the two products is
Uq1 q2	 = r1q1+ r2q2	−
d1q
2
1
2
− d2q
2
2
2
− zq1q2
+ Y − p1q1− p2q2	
where dj > z and the last bracketed term is the consumer’s
utility from the consumption of other products. Then,
U
qj
= rj − djqj − zqi − pj = 0 i j = 12 i = j (19)
Hence the marginal utility from consuming product j
increases with rj and declines with the quantity that the
consumer buys of product j as well as the quantity he buys
of the competing product i. The parameter rj reflects the
consumer’s appreciation of j’s product, which is inversely
related to his expectations concerning security breaches that
firm j might experience.
From (19), we get the following two equations:
q1 =
d2r1− zr2	
d1d2− z2	
− d2p1
d1d2− z2	
+ zp1
d1d2− z2	

q2 =
d1r2− zr1	
d1d2− z2	
− d1p2
d1d2− z2	
+ zp2
d1d2− z2	

(20)
34 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Define
ai +Bi =
djri − zrj
d1d2− z2
 b1 =
dj
d1d2− t2
 b2 =
z
d1d2− t2

Hence, from the definition of Bi, it follows that
gisi sj 	= ai + ti −tj +dsj tj −
djri − zrj
d1d2− z2

For simplicity, assume that the consumer’s appreciation of
product i, as measured by ri, depends on si but is indepen-
dent of the value of sj . Hence ri/si < 0 but ri/sj = 0. As
well, assume that this appreciation declined at an increasing
pace when si increases, thus 2ri/s2i < 0. As a result,
gi
si
= −djri/si
d1d2− z2
> 0
gi
sj
= dtj +
zrj/sj
d1d2− z2

Hence gi/sj < 0 if dtj <−zrj/sj 	/d1d2−z2	. As well,
gi/si> gi/sj  by our assumption that dj > z.
2gi
s2i
= −dj
2ri/s
2
i
d1d2− z2
> 0
2gi
sisj
= 0
2gi
s2j
= z
2rj/s
2
j
d1d2− z2
< 0
Since z < dj , 2gi/s2i  > 2gi/s2j . The above specification
yields all the restrictions we have imposed on the “leakage
costs” function gisi sj 	.
Proof of Proposition 1. From the profit function of firm i,
we first derive the reduced form version of firm i’s profit
function given by Equation (4). From Equations (1) and (3),
the profit function of firm i is
i=piqi−f itiyj 	=piai−b1pi+b2pj+Bi	−f itiyj 	
implying that
di
dpi
=ai−2b1pi+b2pj+Bi
The optimal price is then pi = ai − b1pi + b2pj + Bi	/b1. This
then implies that qi = b1pi. Hence
= qipi − f iti yj 	= b1p2i − f iti yj 	
From Equation (4), the FOC for the second-stage decision
variable; that is, the price leads to the following reaction
function:
pipj 	=
ai + b2pj +Bi
2b1

By solving these two equations simultaneously, we get the
following optimal prices:
pi =
2b1ai + b2aj 	+ 2b1Bi + b2Bj	
4b21 − b22
 (21)
From Equation (21), we then have
pi
ti
= 2b1+ b2dsi −	
4b21 − b22	
> 0 i j = 12 i = j
The above inequality holds since  < 1 and b1 > b2.
From (21), we also have
pi
tj
= 2b1dsj −	+ b2	
4b21 − b22	

Under Assumption 1, the above is positive.
Differentiating further the optimal price w.r.t. si yields
pi
si
= 2b1−g
i/si	+ b2−gj/si	+ b2dti
4b21 − b22	
 (22)
Evaluating the above derivative at si = 0 implies that
pi/sisi=0 > 0 and evaluating the above derivative at si =
sj = 1 implies that pi/sisi=sj=1 < 0 from Assumption 2. As
well, since 2gi/sisj ≤ 0, the derivative pi/si is strictly
increasing in sj . Hence, if pi/sisi=sj=1 < 0, it follows thatpi/sisi=1 < 0 for any value of sj < 1 as well. By our
assumption that 2gi/s2i > 2gj/s2i , it follows that pi/si
is a strictly decreasing function of si. Hence, there exists sci ∈
01	, where pi/si = 0, and the proposition follows. 
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof for the first part fol-
lows from Equations (5), (6), and (22). The proof for
the second part is embedded in the following proof of
Proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Because we do not get closed-form solutions for the
first-stage decision variables, we adopt the implicit func-
tion approach to present our results and gain insights. We
want to perform comparative statics of the firm i’s deci-
sion variables si and ti w.r.t. that of the second firm decision
variables; say, sj . Upon total differentiation of Equations (5)
and (6), we get the following set of equations:
2pi
s2i
dsi +
2pi
siti
dti +
2pi
sisj
dsj = 0 (23)
Hi
si
dsi +
Hi
ti
dti +
Hi
sj
dsj = 0 i j = 12 i = j (24)
The set of two simultaneous equations for each firm leads
us to the following solution for the derivatives dsi/dsj and
dti/dsj : 

dsi
dsj
dti
dsj

=−M−1


2pi
sisj
Hi
sj

 
where
M =


2pi
s2i
2pi
siti
Hi
si
Hi
ti

 
Gal-Or and Ghose: The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information
Information Systems Research 16(2), pp. 186–208, © 2005 INFORMS 203
Here,
Hi
sj
= 2b1
pi
ti
pi
sj
+ 2b1pi
2pi
tisj
−ctj
2f i
tiyj

Hi
si
= 2b1
pi
si
pi
ti
+ 2b1pi
2pi
tisi

Hi
ti
= 2b1
(
pi
ti
)2
+ 2b1pi
2pi
t2i
− 
2f i
t2i

From the expression for the optimal prices given in the
Proof of Proposition 1, we derive the following:
2pi
tisi
= b2d
4b21 − b22	
> 0
2pi
s2i
=−2b1
2gi/s2i + b22gj/s2i
4b21 − b22
< 0
To satisfy the second-order conditions and ensure global
concavity, the determinant of M must be positive and
Hi/ti < 0. Further in equilibrium, pi/si = 0, implying
that Hi/si > 0 since 2pi/tisi > 0.
As well, we proceed to prove that the following expres-
sion is positive:
pi
sj
= 2b1dtj − g
i/sj 	+ b2−gj/sj 	
4b21 − b22

From the FOC pj/sj = 0, we have that
−g
j
sj
= b2
2b1
(
gi
sj
−dtj
)

Hence
pi
sj
= 2b1dtj − g
i/sj 	+ b2/2b1	b2gi/sj − b2dtj 	
4b21 − b22
= dtj − g
i/sj
2b1
> 0
Next, from Equation (21), we show that
2pi
tisj
=0 and 
2pi
sisj
= −2b1
2gi/sisj−b22gj/sisj
4b21−b22
≥0
where the last inequality follows since 2gi/sisj ≤ 0. Hence
Hi/sj > 0 since 2f i/tiyj ≤ 0. The above derivatives help
us establish the comparative statics results with respect to sj .
(ii), (iii) In a similar manner, total differentiation of Equa-
tions (5) and (6) with respect to tj yields


dsi
dtj
dti
dtj

=−M−1


2pi
sitj
Hi
tj

 
It is easy to show that 2pi/sitj = 0 and
Hi
tj
= 2b1
pi
tj
pi
ti
+ 2b1pi
2pi
titj
−csj
2f i
tiyj

Since 2pi/titj = 0 and 2f i/tiyj ≤ 0, a sufficient condi-
tion for Hi/tj > 0 is that pi/tj > 0. Further,
pi
tj
= 2b1dsj −	+ b2	
4b21 − b22

Hence the above is nonnegative as long as  ≤ dsj +
b2/2b1	. By requiring that  ≤ , we guarantee that
pi/tj > 0 for both firms. As a result, Hi/tj is positive
for both firms, and reaction functions are upward sloping
w.r.t. tj (i.e., si/tj > 0 and ti/tj > 0). Note that the con-
dition ≤  is stronger than necessary since Hi/tj can be
positive even when pi/tj < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Similar to the Proof of Propo-
sition 2, upon total differentiation of Equations (5) and (6),
we get the following set of equations:
2pi
s2i
dsi +
2pi
siti
dti +
2pi
sib1
db1 = 0 (25)
Hi
si
dsi +
Hi
ti
dti +
Hi
b1
db1 = 0 (26)
The set of two simultaneous equations for each firm yields

dsi
db1
dti
db1

=−M−1


2pi
sib1
Hi
b1

 
Hi
b1
= 2pi
pi
ti
+ 2b1
pi
b1
pi
ti
+ 2b1pi
2pi
b1ti

Now
pi
ti
= 2b1+ b2dsi −	
4b21 − b22

pi
b1
=−24b1pi − ai +Bi		
4b21 − b22
< 0
2pi
tib1
= 24b
2
1 − b22	− 8b12b1+ b2dsi −		
4b21 − b22	2
< 0
The above expressions imply that
Hi
b1
< 0
In addition, 2pi/sib1 =−2gi/si < 0. As a result, the com-
parative statics with respect to b1 are determined unambigu-
ously (i.e., si/b1 < 0, ti/b1 < 0).
(ii) For the comparative statics with respect to b2, we need
to establish the signs of Hi/b2 and 2pi/sib2. Here,
Hi
b2
= 2b1
pi
b2
pi
ti
+ 2b1pi
2pi
b2ti
 where
pi
b2
= aj +Bj
4b21 − b22
+ 2b2pi
4b21 − b22
> 0
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Similarly, from (21), the expressions for the derivatives of
the equilibrium prices evaluated at the symmetric equilib-
rium are given as follows:
pi
ti
= 2b1+ b2dsi −	
4b21 − b22
> 0
2pi
tib2
= dsi −
4b21 − b22
+ 2b22b1+ b2dsi −		
4b21 − b22	2
= 4b1b2+ 4b
2
1 + b22	dsi −	
4b21 − b22	2

Under the assumption that ≤ , the above second deriva-
tive is positive. In addition,
2pi
sib2
= dti − g
j/si
4b21 − b22
+ −2b1g
i/si − b2gj/si + b2dti	2b2
4b21 − b22	2
> 0
because at the equilibrium, the second term vanishes from
Equation (22). The comparative statics with respect to b2 are
implied by the above derivatives. Note, once again, that the
assumption ≤  is stronger than necessary, since Hi/b2
can be positive even when 2pi/tib2 is negative. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Proof of Proposition 4 is similar
to 2 and 3 above, and hence it is not repeated for brevity.
We only show the relevant expressions.
Hi
ai
= 2b1
pi
ai
pi
ti
+ 2b1pi
2pi
tiai

Hi
aj
= 2b1
pi
aj
pi
ti
+ 2b1pi
2pi
tiaj

Here, pi/ai = 2b1/4b21 − b22	 and pi/aj = b2/4b21 − b22	.
This implies that
pi
aiti
= 
2pi
ajti
= 0
Hence
Hi
ai
= 2b1
pi
ai
pi
ti
> 0
and
Hi
aj
= 2b1
pi
aj
pi
ti
> 0
(i)
Hi
d
= 2b1
pi
d
pi
ti
+ 2b1pi
2pi
tid

Now
pi
d
= 2b1sj tj + b2tisi
4b21 − b22

2pi
sid
= b2ti
4b21 − b22
> 0
2pi
tid
= b2si
4b21 − b22
> 0
Hence si/d > 0, ti/d > 0. In a similar manner, it can
be shown that si/c > 0, ti/c > 0 since
Hi
c
=−
[
2f i
tiyj
]
tj sj > 0
(ii)
Hi

= 2b1
pi

pi
ti
+ 2b1pi
2pi
ti
 where
pi

= −2b1tj + b2ti	
4b21 − b22
< 0
2pi
ti
=− b2
4b21 − b22
< 0
2pi
si
= 0
The above inequalities imply that si/ < 0 and
ti/< 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Solving for the inverse demand
functions from (1) and (3),
pi =
b1ai + b2aj − b1qi + b2qj 	+ b1Bi + b2Bj
b21 − b22

At the symmetric equilibrium we have
p= a+B− q	
b1− b2	

where B = t1− 	+ dts − gis s	. Hence, total welfare is
equal to
SW =
∫ q∗
0
2
a+B− q	
b1− b2
dq− 2f itcts	
where q∗ is the quantity at the market equilibrium. Taking
the derivative w.r.t. s, the optimal sSW is given by the solu-
tion to
SW
s
= 
s
(∫ q∗
0
2
a+B− q	
b1− b2
dq− 2f itcts	
)
= 0
⇔ 2
b1−b2
∫ q∗
0
B
s
dq+2
(
a+B−q∗
b1−b2
)
q∗
s
−2ct
f i
yj
=0
by using Leibnitz theorem.
At the symmetric equilibrium, q∗ = b1p∗ = b1a + B	/
2b1 − b2	 and q∗/s = b1/2b1 − b2	B/s	, where B/s =
dt− gi/si + gi/sj 	.
Hence, we can write this equation as
SW
s
= 2
[
b1a+B	3b1− 2b2	
2b1− b2	2b1− b2	
]
B
s
− 2ct
f i
yj
= 0 (27)
Because the last term is always positive, it follows that
for a fixed t, sSW is bigger than the value satisfying
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B/s = 0. When B/s = 0, dt − gi/si + gj/si	 = 0.
Recall from (22) that in the market equilibrium the condi-
tion, which determines the optimal amount of sharing, is
given by dt−2b1/b2	gi/si	+gj/si	= 0. Since 2b1 > b2,
it follows that for a fixed t, sNE is smaller than the value
satisfying B/S = 0. Hence sNE < sSW .
In a similar manner, differentiating SW with respect to t
as above, we obtain
SW
t
= 
t
(∫ q∗
0
2
a+B− q	
b1− b2
dq− 2f itcts	
)

By using Leibnitz theorem and then rearranging terms, we
obtain the following FOC for t
b13b1− 2b2	a+B	
2b1− b2	2b1− b2	
B
t
−
(
f i
ti
+cs
f i
yj
)
= 0 (28)
where B/t = 1 −  + ds. The solution to this equation
determines the optimal level of security technology invest-
ment. Compare this to the optimal level of technology
investment under the firms’ individual profit maximization
that solves the following equation:
2b1p
pi
ti
= f
i
ti

At the symmetric equilibrium, p = a+ B	/2b1 − b2	 and
pi/ti = 2b1+ b2ds−		/4b21− b22	. Hence the FOC at the
market equilibrium reduces to
2b1a+B	2b1+ b2ds−		
2b1− b2	4b21 − b22	
− f
i
ti
= 0 (29)
When ≤ , it can be shown that 3b1−2b2	2b1+b2	1−+
ds	 > 2b1 − b2	2b1 + b2ds − 		. Hence, a comparison of
Equations (28) and (29) implies that for a fixed level of s, the
socially optimal level of technology investment tSW exceeds
that obtained at the market equilibrium under individual
profit maximization, tNE . When both s and t are chosen opti-
mally, the above inequalities are reinforced since s and t are
strategic complements when ≤ .
From Equations (13) and (14), we have the following:
JP
s
= 4b1a+B	
2b1− b2	2
[
dt−
(
gi
si
+ g
i
sj
)]
− 2ct
f i
yj
= 0
(30)
JP
t
= 4b1a+B	1−+ds	
2b1− b2	2
− 2
[
f i
ti
+cs
f i
yj
]
= 0
(31)
A comparison of (30) with Equations (12, 27) and (31)
with Equations (28) and (29) when  ≤ , implies that the
security technology investment and security information-
sharing levels under joint profit maximization lies in
between social welfare maximization and the market
(Bertrand-Nash) equilibrium. Hence, it follows that tNE <
tJP < tSP and sNE < sJP < sSP . 
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof follows from com-
paring Equations (15) and (16) with Equations (5) and (6),
respectively. The additional terms in Equations (15) and (16)
are the Stackelberg effects and prove the result. Since
pi/sj 	sj/si	 > 0 and when ≤ , pi/tj 	tj/ti	 > 0 at
the levels of simultaneous mode game, to get to the opti-
mum, s∗i  s
∗
j 	 and t
∗
i  t
∗
j 	 must be higher. 
Proof of Proposition 7. (i) The optimal price in this case
is given by
pi =
2b1ai +Bi	+ b2aj +Bj	+ 2b21Fi + b1b2Fj
4b21 − b22	

i j = 12 i = j
We first derive the relevant expressions here.
Bi
ti
= 1 Bj
ti
= dsi −
Bi
si
=−g
i
si

Bj
si
= dti −
gj
si

Next,
Fi
si
= 0 Fi
sj
=−ˆtj*ti	
Fi
ti
= c− ˆtj sj 	*′ ti	
Fj
si
=−ˆti*tj 	
Fj
ti
=−ˆsi*tj 	
As well,
pi
si
= 2b1−g
i/si	+ b2dti − gj/si	− b1b2ˆti*tj 	
4b21 − b22

Comparing this to Equation (22), it is immediate that
spillovers on the marginal cost side reduce willingness to
share compared to spillovers on the fixed cost side.
(ii) Next, we have the following:
pi
ti
= 2b1+ b2dsi −	+ 2b
2
1c− ˆsj tj 	*′ ti	− b1b2ˆsi*tj 	
4b21 − b22

pi
ˆ
= −2b
2
1tj sj*ti	+ b1b2tisi*tj 		
4b21 − b22

Fi
ˆ
=−sj tj*ti	
From the FOCs (17) and (18), we can derive the following
set of simultaneous implicit equations:

dsi
dˆ
dti
dˆ

=−M−1


2pi
siˆ
Hi
ˆ

 
where
M =


2pi
s2i
2pi
siti
Hi
si
Hi
ti

 
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The respective terms within the matrix and their signs are
shown below. First, we have
2pi
siˆ
= −b1b2ti*tj 	
4b21 − b22
< 0
Hi
ˆ
= 2b1
[(
pi
ˆ
− Fi
ˆ
)(
pi
ti
− Fi
ti
)
+ 2b1pi − Fi	
(
2pi
tiˆ
− 
2Fi
tiˆ
)]

Now(
2pi
tiˆ
− 
2Fi
tiˆ
)
= [2b21tj sj*′ ti	− b1b2si*tj 	− b22tj sj*′ ti	]
· 4b21 − b22	−1 > 0 (32)
pi
ti
− Fi
ti
= [2b1+ b2dsi −	− 2b21 + b22	c− ˆsj tj 	*′ ti	
− b1b2ˆsi*tj 	
] · 4b21 − b22	−1 (33)
Next, we show that
2pi
sisj
= −2b1
2gi/sisj − b22gj/sisj
4b21 − b22
> 0
2pi
sitj
= −b1b2tiˆ*
′
tj 	
4b21 − b22
< 0
Hi
si
= 2b1pi − Fi	
(
2pi
tisi
− 
2Fi
tisi
)
+ 2b1
(
pi
si
− Fi
si
)(
pi
ti
− Fi
ti
)

From the FOC (17), we have pi/si = 0 = Fi/si and
2pi/tisi = b2d − b1ˆ*tj 		. Hence
Hi
si
= 2b1pi − Fi	b2d − b1ˆ*tj 		
Under the restriction of the second-order conditions,
Hi/ti < 0 and the determinant M must be positive. How-
ever, because we are unable to sign d − b1ˆ*tj 		 unam-
biguously, we do not have the signs of all the terms in the
matrix. As is immediate, it depends on the relative ratio of
the spillovers parameters, d/ˆ. 
Appendix B. Fostering Optimal Levels of
Information Sharing
Our derivation so far indicates that even though some
sharing of information arises at the market equilibrium,
its level falls short of the one that maximizes social wel-
fare. It is possible, however, for the government to design
a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey 1961,
Clarke 1971, Groves 1973) that will provide incentives to
market participants to select the socially optimal levels of
sharing and investment, derived in the previous section.
Suppose that the government provides a subsidy to firm i
equal to the total consumer surplus generated from prod-
uct i, CSi as well as the total social welfare (sum of con-
sumer and producer surplus) generated from product j , TSj .
Note that this subsidy represents the components of wel-
fare surpluses that a firm neglects to consider when it max-
imizes its own profits. The subsidy Bi is evaluated at the
Bertrand levels of prices and quantities, calculated from (21)
as follows:
p∗i =
a
2b1− b2
+ 2b1Bi + b2Bj
4b21 − b22
and q∗i = b1p∗i  (34)
Hence
Bisi ti sj  tj 	 = CSi + TSj
=
[∫ q∗j
0
∫ q∗i
0
Fiqi qj 	 dqi dqj − p∗i q∗i
]
+
[∫ q∗i
0
∫ q∗j
0
Fj qi qj 	 dqj dqi − f tj  yi	
]
 (35)
To raise revenues to finance the subsidy, the government
imposes also a fixed tax on each firm equal to the above
subsidy expression evaluated at the social welfare maximiz-
ing extent of sharing and security investment. The fixed
tax T for each firm is equal, therefore, to
T = BisSW  tSW  sSW  tSW 	 (36)
The above mechanism induces welfare-maximizing
behavior without costing anything to the government,
because at the equilibrium the levels of the subsidy and tax
are identical (a similar scheme is proposed in Gordon et al.
2003).
The above mechanism assumes that the government has
access to the same information as do the firms. In particular,
in designing the subsidy tax schedule, it is fully informed
of the values of the intercept of the demand a and the
spillover parameters d and c . With full information it is
well known that a regulator can implement the “first-best”
outcome because it does not have to utilize any “revelation
mechanism.” In fact, the government can simply choose the
optimal level of security investment itself and dictate it to
the firms. We have introduced the more complex mecha-
nism described above as a benchmark to be modified as
needed when the government has only partial information
about the environment.
To investigate whether inducing welfare maximization
is feasible with asymmetric information, we consider now
the possibility that the firms have private information about
the values of the parameters. For simplicity, assume that the
cost spillover parameter c is the only one that is privately
observed by the firms. Specifically, each firm can privately
observe the extent to which the information revealed by its
competitor is conducive to reducing its costs of investment
in security technology. Let ic designate the cost spillover
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parameter benefiting firm i, implying that its costs of invest-
ment are f iti yj 	, where yj = icsj tj . Assume also that 1c
and 2c are uncertain and that their values are determined
independently of each other according to an identical uni-
form distribution defined over the support c ¯c. Using
a direct mechanism, as proposed by Vickrey (1961), Clarke
(1971), and Groves (1973), assume that in the first stage the
firms deliver messages about the spillover parameters, that
we designate by ˆic , and in the second stage the government
designs the subsidy tax mechanism contingent upon those
messages.
Note that the expression we derived above for the sub-
sidy awarded to firm i depends upon the costs incurred by
firm j , which, in turn, depends on the value of jc . Hence
with asymmetric information, the government will have
to rely on the report ˆjc delivered by j about its spillover
parameter. Designate by fˆ j tj  yi	 the reported costs of
firm j as implied by the message ˆjc . Similarly, designate byBisi ti sj  tj 	 the subsidy awarded to firm i when reported
costs of j replace actual costs.
The expression for the tax imposed on i will have to
be modified as well, because the social welfare levels of
sharing and investment are now functions of the reports
delivered by the firms (specifically, sˆSWi = sSWi ˆic ˆjc	 andT SWi = tSWi ˆic ˆjc		. We designate by
Ti = BisˆSW  T SW  sˆSW  T SW 	 (37)
the fixed tax imposed on firm i as a function of the messages
delivered by the firms. Firm i chooses its levels of sharing
and investment as well as its report to the government to
maximize its objective defined as follows:
max
si ti ˆ
i
c
V isi ti ˆ
i
c sj  tj 	
= b1p∗i 	2+Eˆjc
{ Bisi ti sj  tj 	− T i} (38)
where p∗i remains as defined in (34) for an environment with
symmetric information (since the value of ic affects only
fixed costs, it does not influence pricing decisions for fixed
levels of sharing and investments by the firms). Note that
firm i cannot observe the message ˆjc delivered by its com-
petitor, given that this message depends on the realization
of the stochastic variable jc . As a result, we include the
expected value operator in V i to evaluate the net subsidy
that i can expect.
The above maximization problem is constrained by indi-
vidual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) con-
straints. The individual rationality constraint requires that
each firm is willing to participate in the subsidy tax scheme,
and the incentive compatibility constraint implies that each
firm has an incentive to truthfully reveal its private infor-
mation. In stating the former constraint, it is important to
explicitly define the “outside option” of each firm. Assum-
ing that the firm can decline to participate in the subsidy
tax scheme and still compete freely in the market under
consideration, the IR constraint becomes
b1p
∗
i 	
2+E
ˆ
j
c
 Bisi ti sj  tj 	− T i ≥ b1p∗i 	2
or
E
ˆ
j
c
 Bisi ti sj  tj 	− T i ≥ 0 (IR1)
In contrast, assuming that the firm is required to be
subject to the subsidy tax scheme, its “outside option” is
defined by the profits it can generate outside of the mar-
ket under consideration, which we normalize to be equal to
zero. The IR constraint in this case becomes
b1p
∗
i 	
2+E
ˆ
j
c
 Bisi ti sj  tj 	− T i ≥ 0 (IR2)
Borrowing terminology that was used in the mechanism
design literature, the IR constraints defined above charac-
terize “interim individual rationality” rather than “ex post
individual rationality” constraints (for every possible value
of jc).
To guarantee that truthful revelation is a weakly domi-
nant strategy, the following IC constraint is implied:
V isi ti
i
c sj  tj 	≥ V isi ti ˆic sj  tj 	
for all ˆic
i
c ∈ c ¯c (IC)
It is noteworthy that the objective of firm i is not a
direct function of the true realization of ic , only of its
report. Specifically, V i/ic = 0. As a result, the government
can design a mechanism with truthful revelation that will
leave each firm without any informational rents. Hence the
interim individual rationality constraints (IR1) or (IR2) are
binding irrespective of the realization of ic (see Myerson
1979, 1981). This implies that the government can, once
again, implement the budget balancing, “first-best” out-
come in spite of asymmetric information.
It is important to note that the above result is valid only
if the government can prevent collusion between the two
firms. Achieving the “first-best” outcome with the VCG
mechanism (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves 1973) is not
feasible when a firm can communicate with its competi-
tor to influence the report it delivers to the government.
As well, when firms have access to private information
about other parameters of the model except ic (ai and 
i
d ,
for instance), the “first-best” outcome is not attainable even
when collusion can be prevented. With private information
about those other parameters, the objective of each firm
depends on its report as well as the true value of its pri-
vate information. The latter dependence results in the exis-
tence of informational rents and possible distortions in the
optimal values of sharing and investment that the govern-
ment can implement with a mechanism that induces truth-
ful revelation. In addition, if interim individual rationality
constraints are replaced by ex post rationality constraints,
distortions may arise even in our environment when private
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information pertains only to ic (this relates to the impossi-
bility theorem derived by Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983).
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